Iran - It's not if, but when.

From the old triads to the new. Please review the DoD loophole for nuclear war and I challenge you to find anything resembling human life and environmental impact other than "minimal collateral damage"

My thinking based upon the material coming out from every possible side, team, shill or alternate news is looking for the timeline. Numerically I cannot find anything but as I like to think of myself as committee step child, heres my most sinister thoughts.

1. Objective - WWIII, the knock out blow. Poker: All in.

2. the Islamic holy month of Ramadan will begin between  August 9-11 2010 and end around  September 9-10

3. Super-NATO (Mossad/CIA) dirty bomb or biological attack in Palestinian territory near Israel settlement. Massive casualties.

4. Israel retaliates with Nuclear Strike on Iran.

5. Super-NATO Attack Pacific. Korea false flag on US Carrier and FF West Coat US during or post  US/S. Korea exercises.  US retaliates with strategic weapons and a nuclear threat if China or Russian intercedes.

6. WWIII (Phony bluff for the audience)

As tired as you all may get from the term "TRIAD" I use so often, never does it play a small role in the formula of committee empire.

Heres a case where they use the term outright and it stinks.

Joint Publication 3-12 - 15 March 2005

Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations

The New Triad 

The new triad offers a mix of strategic offensive and defensive
capabilities that includes nuclear and nonnuclear strike
capabilities, active and passive defenses, and a robust research,
development, and industrial infrastructure to develop, build, and
maintain offensive forces and defensive systems. Enhanced
command and control (C2), intelligence, and adaptive planning
capabilities support the new triad. The new triad provides a deterrence
posture suitable for the emerging threat environment; it incorporates
post-Cold War advances in defensive and nonnuclear capabilities;
and, it provides additional military options that are credible to
adversaries and reassuring to allies.

Fundamental Considerations

Strategic deterrence is defined as the prevention of adversary
aggression or coercion that threatens vital interests of the United
States and/or our national survival. Strategic deterrence
convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action
by means of decisive influence over their decision making.
Deterrence broadly represents the manifestation of a potential
adversary’s decision to forego actions that he would otherwise
attempt. Diplomatically, the central focus of deterrence is for
one nation to exert such influence over a potential adversary’s
decision-making process that the potential adversary makes a
deliberate choice to refrain from a course of action. The focus of
US deterrence efforts is therefore to influence potential
adversaries to withhold actions intended to harm US’ national
interests. Such a decision is based on the adversary’s perception
of the benefits of various courses of action compared with an
estimation of the likelihood and magnitude of the costs or
consequences corresponding to these courses of action. It is these
adversary perceptions and estimations that US deterrent actions
seek to influence. Potential adversary decision making in the
face of US deterrent actions is also influenced by their strategic
culture, idiosyncrasies of decision mechanisms and the leader’s
decision style, and leadership risk tolerance.

Declaratory Policy.

The US does not make positive statements defining the
circumstances under which it would use nuclear weapons.
Maintaining US ambiguity about when it would use nuclear
weapons helps create doubt in the minds of potential adversaries,
deterring them from taking hostile action. This calculated
ambiguity helps reinforce deterrence. If the US clearly defined
conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons, others
might infer another set of circumstances in which the US would
not use nuclear weapons. This perception would increase the
chances that hostile leaders might not be deterred from taking
actions they perceive as falling below that threshold.

Nuclear Posture Review - 1 December 2001.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm

[Excerpt] 

The following is a summary of the highlights in this report.First and foremost, the Nuclear Posture Review puts the Cold War practices related to planning for strategic forces behind us. In the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, planning for the employment of U.S. nuclear forces has undergone only modest revision, despite the new relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Few changes had been made to the size or composition of the strategic nuclear force beyond those required by the START Treaty. At the same time, plans and funding for sustaining some critical elements of that force have been inadequate.As a result of this review, the U.S. will no longer plan, size or sustain its forces as though Russia presented merely a smaller version of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union. Following the direction laid down for U.S. defense planning in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review shifts planning for America's strategic forces from the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based approach. This new approach should provide, over the coming decades, a credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with U.S. and allied security.Second, we have concluded that a strategic posture that relies solely on offensive nuclear forces is inappropriate for deterring the potential adversaries we will face in the 21st century. Terrorists or rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely test America's security commitments to its allies and friends. In response, we will need a range of capabilities to assure friend and foe alike of U.S. resolve. A broader array of capability is needed to dissuade states from undertaking political, military, or technical courses of action that would threaten U.S. and allied security. U.S. forces must pose a credible deterrent to potential adversaries who have access to modern military technology, including NBC weapons and the means to deliver them over long distances. Finally, U.S. strategic forces need to provide the President with a range of options to defeat any aggressor.To meet the nation's defense goals in the 21st century, the first leg of the New Triad, the offensive strike leg, will go beyond the Cold War triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range nuclear-armed bombers. ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers and nuclear weapons will, of course, continue to play a vital role. However, they will be just part of the first leg of the New Triad, integrated with new non-nuclear strategic capabilities that strengthen the credibility of our offensive deterrence.The second leg of the New Triad requires development and deployment of both active and passive defenses--a recognition that offensive capabilities alone may not deter aggression in the new security environment of the 21st century. The events of September 11, 2001 underscore this reality. Active and passive defenses will not be perfect. However, by denying or reducing the effectiveness of limited attacks, defenses can discourage attacks, provide new capabilities for managing crises, and provide insurance against the failure of traditional deterrence.The third leg of the New Triad is a responsive defense infrastructure. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. defense infrastructure has contracted and our nuclear infrastructure has atrophied. New approaches to development and procurement of new capabilities are being designed so that it will not take 20 years or more to field new generations of weapon systems. With respect to the nuclear infrastructure, it needs to be repaired to increase confidence in the deployed forces, eliminate unneeded weapons, and mitigate the risks of technological surprise. Maintaining our ability to respond to large strategic changes can permit us to reduce our nuclear arsenal and, at the same time, dissuade adversaries from starting a competition in nuclear armaments.The effectiveness of this New Triad depends upon command and control, intelligence, and adaptive planning. "Exquisite" intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of adversaries can permit timely adjustments to the force and improve the precision with which it can strike and defend. The ability to plan the employment of the strike and defense forces flexibly and rapidly will provide the U.S. with a significant advantage in managing crises, deterring attack and conducting military operations.Constructing the New Triad, reducing our deployed nuclear weapons, and increasing flexibility in our strategic posture has resource implications. It costs money to retire old weapons systems and create new capabilities. Restoring the defense infrastructure, developing and deploying strategic defenses, improving our command and control, intelligence, planning, and non-nuclear strike capabilities require new defense initiatives and investments. However, these investments can make the U.S. more secure while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons.The Quadrennial Defense Review established the foundation for America's post-Cold War defense strategy. Building on the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review will transform the Cold War era offensive nuclear triad into a New Triad designed for the decades to come.

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

footnote: adaptive = false flag  and exquisite = false Intelligence