ABLE DANGER 9/11 AND THE BULLSHIT COMMISSION

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ABLE DANGER 9/11 AND THE BULLSHIT COMMISSION

[From, Richard Clark | Op-Ed News | October 9 --Plus Able Danger Blog]

Former intelligence officer Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer's new book reveals that BushCo knew that plans were being made for the 9/11 attack, but chose to do nothing to stop it and a few things to make sure it succeeded.

This is why the Defense Intelligence Agency recently demanded, after buying up the first 10,000 copies of the book, that all references to a meeting between Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer, the book's author, and the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, be removed from the book. In that meeting, which took place in Afghanistan, Col. Shaffer alleges that the head of the 9/11 Commission was told about the identification of Mohammed Atta prior to the attacks. So why wasn't any mention of this made in the final 9/11 report?

Shaffer, who was undercover at the time he spoke with Zelikow in Afghanistan, said there was "stunned silence" at the meeting when he told the executive director of the commission and others that Atta had been identified as a terrorist as early as 2000 by Shaffer's "Able Danger" research team. And if this is true, why wasn't Atta on some kind of terrorist watch list at every airport on 9/11?

According to Shaffer's account of their meeting, "Dr. Philip Zelikow approached me in the corner of the room and said, 'What you said today is very important. I need you to get in touch with me as soon as you return from your deployment here in Afghanistan'."

Once back in the U.S., Col. Shaffer says he contacted the 9/11 Commission as requested. Without explanation, however, the commission was no longer interested in any evidence that Atta had been identified as a terrorist a year before 9/11. An inspector general report by the Department of Defense then concluded there was "no evidence" to support the claims of Shaffer and others. But Fox News has obtained an un-redacted copy of the IG report containing the names of witnesses, who backed up Shaffer's story when contacted for comment.

What role did our Department of Defense play in preparation for the events of 9/11?

A growing number of credible scientists and engineers have proven beyond any doubt that the destruction of the World Trade Center was caused by controlled demolition. The "hard science" and "hard evidence" is there for anyone to examine. Telltale thermate residue was found in almost all the dust and ash from the demolition of the twin towers, and there are no longer any doubts about this in the minds of anyone willing to examine the evidence with an open mind.

Moreover, every aspect of the official investigation into the events of 9/11 has been shown to have been compromised and/or openly interfered with, and all this has been carefully documented, yet not widely reported in the United States.

Here's what is being discovered:

1. An Arab terrorist group began planning the 9/11 attacks during the late 1990s and was infiltrated by the Mossad and/or agents working for the CIA

2. The original terrorist planning was supplemented, paralleled, augmented and perhaps eventually replaced by a vast and highly complex domestic "false flag" attack, the ultimate purpose of which was to realign some of the world's political and economic realities.

3. Israel, with its considerable influence over American mainstream media, and its ability to operate openly and with impunity inside the United States, took the lead in making sure the attacks would take place without fail. Arabs would quickly be blamed and a carefully scripted press account would "seal the deal," while a rigged investigation was already "in the can."

In an attempt to maintain the supposed "integrity' of the falsified investigation, the Pentagon recently paid $47,000 for 9,500 copies of Operation Dark Heart, the memoir of former intelligence officer Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer. We were told the book contained classified information on Afghanistan -- information that would aid the enemy. But this was a lie. What the book contained was a chapter on Operation Able Danger, a Pentagon effort involving Shaffer and other officers using the Internet and "open source" information to track terrorist organizations. By this means, Shaffer and his group, Captain Scott Phillpott, James D. Smith, and Major Eric Kleinschmidt, identified, as early as 1999, the group accused of planning and executing the 9/11 attack! Further, Shaffer's group had created a chart showing the structure of the terrorist organization. Mohammed Atta, reputed leader of the 9/11 operation, was prominently featured, his photograph placed in the "number one" position among the terrorists who were being tracked or should be tracked.

When attempts were made to inform the FBI about this discovery, the Department of Defense ordered that all information on the future hijackers be destroyed, and that the group's efforts to warn appropriate counter-terrorist organizations be stopped.

In 2005, 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean said he was aware of the Able Danger report but that no evidence had been provided that backed up the claims of any foreknowledge of 9/11. However, on June 14, 2004, an unnamed high ranking Navy officer informed the 9/11 Commission that he had reviewed the charts and other materials we now know to have been destroyed on orders of the DIA. The Commission chose to ignore this officer's report and omitted any record of it from their findings.

So here we have evidence that, not only did the government have full knowledge of the accused hijackers 2 years in advance of the attack, but that they destroyed the evidence and thereby prevented the terrorists from being arrested prior to their planned date for the attack!

And now the members of the 9/11 Commission are unable to give any credible reason why they failed to investigate these allegations of Lt. Col. Shaffer and his team of researchers.

See Also:
http://www.abledangerblog.com/2006/02/lt-col-shaffers-written-testimony.html

(U) While I was assigned to Bagram, AFG, I was given permission by my on the ground, Army chain of command to brief Mr. Zelikow and his investigators, at the SECRET level on ABLE DANGER. I prepared a page and ¼ of bullet points (that I’ve provided to the HASC) for use in briefing the staffers. There were probably about 10 people in the room when I conducted my briefing – four staffers and six DoD folks.

(U) I conducted a briefing of about 1 hour and a quarter to Dr. Zelikow and the staffers – covering the high points that I’ve noted in my testimony in the closed session. Dr. Phillip Zelikow, staff director of the 9/11 commission approached me at the conclusion of the meeting and gave me his card and said “What you have said here today is very important. Please contact me upon your return to the United States so we can continue this dialogue”. By the 9/11 commission’s own public statements made in September 2005 regarding ABLE DANGER, I was the first officer to tell them about the existence of the project.
U) Upon my return from Afghanistan, I took about 30 days of leave – and then, assigned to work as the Deputy Chief and Operations Officer of the Afghanistan Operations Task Force, I returned to duty the first week of January 2004 [ ] It was this first week of January 2004 that I called the number given to me on Dr. Zelikow’s card. I was told by the person who answered the phone that “yes – we remember you – let me talk to Dr. Zelikow to find out when he wants you to come in.” I also notify my DIA chain of command, both verbally and in writing, that I had been contacted by the 9/11 commission in Afghanistan and had re-contacted them, via phone the first week of January – and told my DIA chain to expect to be contacted with a request for me to meet with the 9/11 commission on ABLE DANGER. As I recall, I notified my immediate boss Navy Captain Mike Andersen – and the e-mail I believe went even higher up the chain.

(U) I do not hear anything back from the 9/11 commission so I call them again about a week to 10 days after my initial call (second/third week of June 2004). I speak to the same person again, but his tone is different – he tells me that “they have found all the information they need on ABLE DANGER so there would be no need for me to come in to speak to them”. I was shocked in a way – since they had never asked me to provide lead information (i.e. asked the question as to “who else knows this information, too?) – but figured they may have found Capt Phillpott or Dr. Preisser since they had similar knowledge of the project. I had moved my set of ABLE DANGER documents to the third floor of DIA’s Clrendon facility in anticipation that the 9/11 commission would want to see them so I kept them with me in my new office space.

(U) However, life did not go back to normal. Immediately after I notified the chain of command on my contact with the 9/11 commission, my life became strange. I was scrutinized and harassed on virtually every issue I had to deal with – I volunteered to return to serve with the Rangers in Afghanistan (based on a written request from their G2, LTC Mo Morrison) – and was given a written negative counseling by Mike Andersen telling me that I could not volunteer to return to a combat zone!!! I was now being constantly harassed, and my request to return to Afghanistan to continue the fight was initially denied [ ] I was threatened with disciplinary action if I did not show up everyday in military uniform. In other words I was treated like a brand new recruit rather than a seasoned two decade professional who was preparing a team and himself for a deployment into a combat zone.

(U) My senior rater, Captain [ ], the chief of the Pacific Division of Defense HUMINT (who’s oversight included Afghanistan) told me behind closed doors that “they (leadership) are really upset with you this time – they are really out to do something to you” – I asked him to identify who “they” were by name, and what the issue was – he would not answer the questions.

“It did not fit with the story we wanted to tell”

Congressman Weldon asked Russ Caso, his chief of staff, to call the 9/11 commission and find out if they (the 9/11 commission) had ever heard of ABLE DANGER. Mr. Caso left the room and called Chris Cojm at the 9/11 Discourse Project and asked him if they had ever “heard of something called ABLE DANGER”. Chris quickly checked and told Russ “Yes – we had heard of it” – Russ then asked him why they had not put it in their final report – Cojm’s answer was this “it did not fit with the story we wanted to tell”.

The classified methods and technology are not the key to the ABLE DANGER story – the key is the lack of individual and organizational accountability and their failure to have effectively utilized the intelligence and operational capabilities prior to 9/1.

The system is broken – if they can do this to me – slander and malign me and ignore exculpatory evidence – only look at bad issues and consider none of the successes and good work I’ve done over the past 23 years, they can (and would) do this to anyone who stands up to try and set the record straight.

It appears as if ABLE DANGER were in the middle of an Orwellian 1984 rewrite of history when Congressman Weldon found and got the story out. How is it that this information has been “disappearing” over the past five years? How could lawyers misinterpret the law and regulations so clearly as to “delete” the equivalent ¼ of the Library of Congress? How is it that just after I approach the 9-11 commission that I am suspended over three administrative issues that did not then, and do not now hold water, and that my entire issue of ABLE DANGER documents not only go missing, but are later revealed by DIA leadership to have been “destroyed” by DIA without explanation. These are questions that beg to be answered.--Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer