A leading Afghan Marxist, Babrak Karmal (1929-1996) became Russian puppet ruler of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan after the Russian invasion in December 1979 until his resignation "because of ill health" on May 4, 1986. Twenty years ago the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan for good. Ten years and tens of thousands of lives were lost in the "bleeding wound" coined by Gorbachev.
The documents detail the Soviet leadership’s preoccupation that, before withdrawal of troops could be carried out, the Afghan internal situation had to be stabilized and a new government should be able to rely on its domestic power base and a trained and equipped army able to deal with the mujahideen opposition. The Soviets sought to secure the Afghan borders through some kind of compromise with the two other most important outside players—Pakistan, through which weapons and aid reached the opposition, and the United States, provider of the bulk of that aid. In the process of Geneva negotiations on Afghanistan, which were initiated by the United Nations in 1982, the United States, in the view of the Soviet reformers, was dragging its feet, unwilling to stop arms supplies to the rebels and hoping and planning for the fall of the pro-Soviet Najibullah regime after the Soviet withdrawal.
Thinking in terms of the farce of Charlie Wilsons war and the true power and money thrown behind the Afghan Mujahideen to thwart the Soviet success, it comes to mind the turnabout is fair play when accepting the COTO tenet of the the triad of Cold War and the manipulators behind the bankruptcy/collapse of the USSR and the looming one facing us as the Committee and Obama carry on year eight of what would be a twenty year engagement in Afghanistan.
From the GWU archives
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Between cde. M. S. Gorbachev and General Secretary of the CC NDPA, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of DRA B. Karmal.
Kremlin, 14 March 1985
Cde. A. A. Gromyko took part in the conversation.
M. S. GORBACHEV. First of all, I would like to thank you and, through you, all the Afghan leadership wholeheartedly for the respect you have shown to K. U. Chernenko’s memory. While K. U. Chernenko was CC CPSU General Secretary and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, he constantly monitored the issues related to the Afghan revolution closely. I would like to affirm that in the future the Afghan comrades can count fully on our support and solidarity.
B. KARMAL. Thank you very much.
M. S. GORBACHEV. Today we do not have much time for conversation, but as I understand, we have an agreement in principle to meet in the nearest future for more detailed conversations. Let me focus on the following moments points today.
We can see that the DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) leadership is
studying the situation more deeply, gaining more experience in leading the country, building the revolutionary-democratic Afghanistan. The positive processes unfolding in Afghanistan are evident. And all this is taking place notwithstanding the difficult situation, where the PDPA [People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan] and the Afghan people have to repel the attacks of the counterrevolution. However, while speaking about the positive shifts in the DRA, at the same time we have to note, from the standpoint of Marxist-Leninist analysis and from the standpoint of realism, that your party still has to do a lot of work to solve its main task—to ensure the genuinely irreversible character of the revolutionary process in Afghanistan. To a considerable extent, it has to do with being able to defend revolutionary gains. Of course you remember Lenin’s thought that one criterion of survival for any revolution is its ability to defend itself. You, comrade Karmal, naturally, understand, as other members of the Afghan leadership obviously do, that Soviet troops cannot stay in Afghanistan forever.
In terms of assessment, I would like to make an observation of a general character, of which you are aware, that the revolution in Afghanistan at its present stage, judging by its content and the moving forces, represents a national-democratic [revolution], and that its socialist stage is the course of the future. If you and I accept this statement as correct, then concrete political and practical conclusions follow from it. It is necessary to achieve in practice a situation where the social and class basis of the new regime would be expanded, so that you could ensure the union of the party with various societal forces at the stage of the national-democratic revolution. It would allow you to stabilize the situation, consolidate the revolutionary gains, and begin to resolve more difficult tasks. Only the party is capable of resolving the task of uniting all the progressive forces -- the party, which is capable of developing a realistic policy, a cohesive and disciplined party, drawn together by the unity of its goals and tasks. Being the organizing center of all progressive forces, the party should not cloister itself within the framework of its own primary organizations. It is necessary that it develop broad and solid ties with the masses.
In conclusion, I would like to say that the USSR will continue to help revolutionary Afghanistan, but the Afghan leadership must understand that with all our assistance the main responsibility rests upon them, upon the entire PDPA.
We are coming face to face with many difficult problems indeed. Yet I can assure you that the revolutionary process in Afghanistan has an irreversible character, and that we can defend our revolution. We see our main task as standing more solidly on our own feet, strengthening the revolutionary regime with all it takes. In our work within thecountry, we rely on the fundamental premises of Marxist-Leninist theory and on Leninist methods of work.
I would like to draw your attention to the following issue. After the victory of the April revolution in Afghanistan, one can say that 95% percent of the population supported it. As a whole, the people accepted and supported the objectives and tasks announced by the PDPA. However, on the eve of the beginning of the new stage in our revolution, in December 1979, the overwhelming majority of our people were against the party, and against friendship with the Soviet Union. One can say that against this negative background, we can see well the positive changes we have achieved in the last five years.
Today, a significant part of the population supports us. As far as the attitude toward the Soviet Union is concerned, it has also changed substantially—in various regions of the country, Afghans seek help not only from the local authorities, but also directly from the Soviet comrades, including seeking help to protect themselves from bandits. The Afghan people are uniting gradually around the PDPA, the DRA party and state leadership.
The problems that we are currently facing are a to considerable extent growing pains, connected with the development of our party and society at the present stage of the revolution. I fully agree with the thoughts that you expressed earlier regarding what we should focus on. It is true, only a united, cohesive party, functioning with iron discipline, can save the revolution, defend and expand its gains.
One of the main shortcomings in our work is the still weak connection between the party and the people. We intend, as Lenin taught us, to do everything in our power to strengthen the connection with the masses, to win their confidence. We are also mobilizing opportunities to move forward on other issues that are most important: strengthening the armed forces, working with the tribes, defending the border with Pakistan and Iran. If we could ensure reliable protection of the borders, that would be a most powerful blow against the plans of the American imperialists, the Chinese hegemonists, the Pakistani reactionaries, and other forces hostile to us.
A. A. GROMYKO. That is right. Defense of the borders is one of the most important tasks indeed.
M. S. GORBACHEV. It would be nice, comrade Karmal, if by the time of our next meeting, the Afghan friends could achieve new progress and success in their work,about which we could talk then. We invite a DRA delegation to take part in celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people’s victory in the Great Patriotic War.
B. KARMAL. I appreciate it deeply. It is a great honor for us. As always, we count on the assistance and comradely recommendations of our Soviet friends. I thank you for this conversation with all my heart.
A. M. Alexandrov was present at the conversation.
Third Secretary of the Middle East Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cde. M. M. Pashkov translated and recorded the conversation.
[Source: The Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. Volkogonov Collection, Reel 17, Container 26. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, The National Security Archive]
Puppet dictators, puppet talk and puppet plans all manipulated by the Committee against a people who will not succumb to any leader or foreign interest under any label. Another Vietnam and another move to destroy a sovereign nation, a religious people not interested in Illuminati globalization. A people tough as nails and willing to be nailed to the wall and that's what it will take. The War on Terror was created for the invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan unless they come willingly. Not likely to happen here. The mysterious Taliban and non-existent Al-Qaeda would never last a day against the Pashtun Mujahideen farmers.
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